
Lord Byron: The Demons of
Calvinism
an essay by Gary
Sloan
George Noel Gordon, Lord Byron (1788-1824) was once the most celebrated
poet in Europe. Handsome and charismatic, he was the darling of polite society,
the cynosure of salons, a pacesetter in fashion and mannerism, the observed of
all observers. Smitten debutantes, madams, and maidservants vied for the
attention of the dashing peer of the realm. Men envied him. Childe Harold’s
Pilgrimage, published when the poet was twenty-four, captivated the romantic
imagination of a continent. “I awoke one day,” said Byron, “and found
myself famous.” Despite his demurrals, readers fused him with Childe Harold—a
brooding, enigmatic pariah haunted by a dark past and nameless guilt.
Though he cloned Childe Harold several times, Byron was no one-trick pony (or
poet). Don Juan, his epic masterpiece, is, as he said, “a little
quietly facetious on everything.” It bristles with trenchant
quips on the eternal human comedy: “´Life’s a poor player’—then play
out the play, / Ye villains! And above all keep a sharp eye / Much less on what
you do than what you say: / Be hypocritical, be cautious, be / Not what you seem,
but always what you see.” “All present life is but an interjection, /
An ‘Oh!’ or ‘Ah!’ of joy or misery, / Or a ‘Ha! Ha!’ Or ‘Bah!’—a
yawn or ‘Pooh!’ / Of which perhaps the latter is most true.”
Bryon was a master of the ingenious rhyme:
Christians have
burnt each other, quite persuaded
That all the
Apostles would have done as they did.
And:
But—Oh! ye lords
of ladies intellectual,
Inform us truly,
have they not hen-pecked you all?
Even his wife, no fan, conceded his verbal brilliance: “He is the absolute
monarch of words.”
When he died of a fever in Missolonghi, where he was aiding the Greeks in
their struggle for independence from the Ottoman Empire, newspapers called him
and Napolean the greatest men of the era. Goethe, the reigning monarch of belles
lettres, hailed him as “a personality of such eminence as has never been
and is not likely to come again.”
“Eminence” played better on the Continent than in England. There, long
before his death, Byron’s fame had mutated to infamy. In separation papers,
Lady Annabella Milbanke, his wife and the mother of his infant daughter, Ada,
accused him of psychological and physical abuse, including attempted rape. Soon,
his private history, sordid and profligate, became public. One report had him
and some Cambridge cronies, dressed as monks and using skulls for bowls, keeping
wassail at his abbey. Gossip sheets sizzled with lurid tales of homoeroticism,
pederasty, whoremongering, adultery, and an incestuous liaison with his
half-sister, Augusta Leigh. Throughout England, the clergy thundered “on his
head pious libels by no means few.”
Ostracized in London, where he was then living, Byron fled England in April
1816. He never returned. He spent his final eight years in Italy, Switzerland,
and Greece. Reviled at home, he was feted abroad.
Caroline Lamb, a blue blood who hounded Byron into an affair, said he was “mad,
bad, and dangerous to know.” (Her kind of man, apparently.) George Ticknor, a
literary acquaintance, described him as “gentle, mannerly, natural,
affectionate, and modest.” Both were right. Byron was an amalgam of disparate
traits: cruelty and kindness; misanthropy and philanthropy; cynicism and
idealism; affectation and sincerity; arrogance and self-mockery; pettiness and
magnanimity; intemperance and asceticism; self-pity and courage. On balance, the
virtues trumped the vices: “For all his flashes of vulgarity, his unworthy
intrigues, his intellectual caprices,” biographer Ethel Mayne concluded, “Byron
was a man of daring, tenderness, and candor, and one of the most generous
spirits of his age.”
His vices were aggravated by indoctrination to Calvinism, which he could
never quite shake despite “an early dislike to the persuasion.” Of his first
grammar school, in Aberdeen, Scotland, he reminisced: “I learned little there—except
to repeat by rote the first lesson of monosyllables—‘God made man—let us
love him’—by hearing it often repeated.” Harangued by a pious, domineering
mother and catechized by a string of Presbyterian tutors and Scripture-quoting
nurses, young Byron perversely deduced he was irremediably damned. A clubfoot
(his mark of Cain), the mockery of playmates, and the early loss of his father
confirmed his reprobate status. His wife, who wrote an account of their stormy
marriage, limned a victim of religion gone haywire: “His principal insane
ideas are—that he must be wicked—is foredoomed to evil—and compelled by
some irresistible power to follow this destiny.”
Armed with a Puritan conception of wickedness, Byron wallowed in Olympian
debauchery, oscillating between “ungodly glee” and self-loathing. His
Calvinistic conscience doomed him to a repetitive round of sin, remorse, and
desire for punishment. “Byron,” said critic Mario Praz, “wished to
experience the feeling of being struck with full force by the vengeance of
Heaven. The gloomy tragedy of his life was set in a moral torture chamber.”
Like Childe Harold, Byron was tormented “by demons, who impair / The strength
of better thoughts, and seek their prey / In melancholy bosoms, such as were /
Of moody texture from their earliest day, / And loved to dwell in darkness and
dismay.”
His unmerited reprobation led him to identify with Lucifer and Cain: “Souls
who dare look the Omnipotent tyrant in / His everlasting face, and tell Him that
/ His evil is not good.” In Cain, a closet drama on the Fall, the
scofflaws collaborate on an indictment of the Almighty.
Why, Cain grouses, should he be punished for his parents’ disobedience? He
didn’t pluck the forbidden fruit: “What had I done in this? I was unborn.”
Besides, wasn’t Jehovah guilty of entrapment: “The tree was planted, and why
not for him [Adam]? / If not, why place him near it, where it grew, / The
fairest in the center?” In any event, why proscribe knowledge and life: “How
can both be evil?”
When he queries his parents, he gets nothing but sophistry:
They have but
One answer to
all questions, “’Twas His will,
And He
is good.” How know I that? Because
He is
all-powerful, must all-good, too, follow?
No, Lucifer tells him: “Evil and good are things in their own essence, /
And not made good or evil by the giver.” Knowledge and life are inherently
good. Lucifer, a proponent of both, is called wicked because conquerors define
morality: “Were I the victor, His works would be deemed the only evil
ones.”
Most ethereal beings, says Lucifer, are servile hypocrites who worship the
Almighty out of fear, not love. Those (like him) who refuse to kowtow are
treated to draconian punishment: “Higher things than ye are slaves: and higher
/ Than them or ye would be so, did they not / Prefer an independency of torture
/ To the smooth agonies of adulation / In hymns and harpings, and self-seeking
prayers.”
Ever since they ate the apple, Cain notes, his parents and siblings have been
like mindless serfs: “My father is / Tamed down; my mother has forgot the mind
/ Which made her thirst for knowledge at the risk / Of an eternal curse; my
brother is / A watching shepherd boy, who offers up / The firstlings of the
flock to Him who bids / The earth yield nothing to us without sweat; / My sister
Zillah sings hymns.”
Jehovah, Lucifer assures Cain, wanted humans to live as beasts in “A
Paradise of Ignorance, from which / Knowledge is barred as poison.” He
inflicted the race with such “poor attributes as suit / Reptiles engendered
out of the subsiding / Slime of a mighty universe, crushed into / A scarcely-yet
shaped planet, peopled with / Things whose enjoyment was to be in blindness.”
Thought he imprisoned in “foul and fulsome” flesh racked by hunger, thirst,
deprivation, sickness, debility, disease, pain. Sexual pleasure, the Puritan
archangel advises, was a machination to perpetuate misery: “A sweet
degradation / A most enervating and filthy cheat / To lure thee on to the
renewal of / Fresh souls and bodies, all foredoomed to be / frail and unhappy.”
Lucifer sums up the human lot: “Eat, drink, toil, tremble, laugh, weep, sleep,
and die.”
The Tree of Knowledge, Cain carps, “was a lying tree, for we know nothing.”
Or, rather, he knows only that life isn’t worth the living: “I live, / But
live to die; and, living, see no thing / To make death hateful, save an innate
clinging, / A loathsome, and yet all invincible / Instinct of life, which I
abhor, as I / Despise myself, yet cannot overcome / and so I live.”
Lucifer, no false comforter, tells Cain his posterity will have it worse than
he. His suffering and sorrow “are both Eden / In all its innocence compared to
what / Thou shortly mayst be; and that state again, / In its redoubled
wretchedness, a Paradise / To what thy sons’ sons’ sons, accumulating / In
generations like to dust (which they / In fact but add to), shall endure and do.”
Before disappearing, Lucifer—perhaps recalling he is a bearer of light—rouses
Cain with a pep talk on the power of reason to surmount celestial despotism:
One good
gift has the fatal apple given—
Your reason:
let it not be over-swayed
By tyrannous
threats to force you into faith
‘Gainst all
external sense and inward feeling:
Think and
endure—and form an inner world
In your own
bosom—where the outward fails.
Whenever Byron escaped the undertow of Calvinism, he wrote like an
Enlightenment rationalist. “In morality,” he remarked, “I prefer Confucius
to the ten Commandments and Socrates to St. Paul.” He disdained revelation and
mystery: “God would have made his Will known without books,” he told his
lifelong friend Francis Hodgson, a cleric, “considering how very few could
read when Jesus of Nazareth lived, had it been His pleasure to ratify any
peculiar mode of worship.”
“I wouldn’t subscribe to some of the articles of faith,” he told a
correspondent, “if I were as sure as St. Peter after the Cock crew. I refuse
to take the Sacrament because I do not think eating Bread or drinking wine from
the hand of an earthly vicar will make me an inheritor of Heaven.” On
miracles, he sided with the skeptics: “I agree with Hume that it is more
probable men should lie or be deceived than that things out of the course of
nature should so happen.” Resurrection made no sense: “If people are to
live, why die? And are our carcasses worth raising? I hope, if mine is, I shall
have a better pair of legs than I have moved on these two-and-twenty years, or I
shall be sadly behind in the squeeze into Paradise.” Like eternal punishment,
eternal bliss was unjust: “All the pious deeds performed on Earth can never
entitle a man to everlasting happiness.”
The Christian scheme of salvation was superfluous: “Christ came to save
men, but a good Pagan will go to heaven and a bad Nazarene to hell. If mankind
who never heard or dreamt of Galilee and its Prophet may be saved, Christianity
is of no avail. And who will believe God will damn men for not knowing what they
were never taught?” Even were Christianity valid, the Christian is no more
spiritually secure than the ancient Roman: “According to the Christian
dispensation, no one can know whether he is sure of salvation—even the most
righteous—since a single slip of faith may throw him on his back, like a
skater, while gliding smoothly to his paradise. Therefore, whatever the
certainty of faith in the facts may be, the certainty of the individual as to
his happiness or misery is no greater than it was under Jupiter.”
Byron anticipated Freud’s “moral fallacy” of Christianity: “The basis
of your religion,” he wrote Hodgson, “is injustice. The Son of God, the
pure, the immaculate, the innocent, is sacrificed for the guilty. This proves His
heroism; but no more does away with man’s guilt than a schoolboy’s
volunteering to be flogged for another would exculpate the dunce from negligence
or preserve him from the rod. You degrade the Creator by converting Him into a
tyrant over an immaculate and injured Being, sent to suffer death for the
benefit of some millions of scoundrels, who, after all, seem as likely to be
damned as ever.”
Byron judged religions pragmatically by the moral character of their
adherents. On that score, Christianity did not impress him: “Talk of
Galileeism? Show me the effects—are you better, wiser, kinder by your
precepts? I will bring you ten Mussulmans shall shame you in all good will
towards men and duty to their neighbours.” On the efforts of Hodgson and
another Christian friend to proselytize him, Byron commented: “If Hodgson
takes half the pains to save his own soul, which he risks to redeem mine, great
will be his reward hereafter; I honor and thank you both, but am convinced by
neither.”
Byron disdained institutionalized religion: “I know nothing, at least in
its favour,” he wrote. “We have fools in all sects and impostors in most.”
Elsewhere, he said: “I am no Platonist, I am nothing at all; but I would
sooner be a Paulician, Manichean, Spinozist, Gentile, Pyrrhonian, Zoroastrian,
than one of the seventy-two villainous sects tearing each other to pieces for
the love of the Lord and hatred of each other.”
In The Vision of Judgment, a satirical tour de force on
Christian eschatology, Byron ridiculed the Church of England:
I know this is
unpopular; I know
‘Tis
blasphemous; I know one may be damned
For hoping no one
else may e’er be so;
I know my
catechism; I know we’re crammed
With the best
doctrines till we quite o’erflow;
I know that all
save England’s church have shammed,
And that the other
twice two hundred churches
And synagogues
have made a damned bad purchase.
Don Juan percolates with saucy irreverence. Imperiled by a sinking
ship, a passenger asks a clergyman (Pedrillo) to pray for him: “And there was
one / That begged Pedrillo for an absolution / Who told him to be damned in his
confusion.” For spiritual solace, religion had a worthy competitor: “There’s
naught, no doubt, so much the spirit calms / As rum and true religion.” Then,
there was the Reverend Rodomont Precisian: “Who did not so much hate the sin
as the sinner.” Don Juan’s mother is stumped by an English idiom: “´Tis
strange—the Hebrew noun which means ‘I am,’ / The English always use to
govern ‘damn.’” The son, too, was baffled:
Juan . . .did not
understand a word
Of English, save
their shibboleth, “God damn!”
And even that he
had so rarely heard,
He sometimes
thought ‘twas only their “Salam,”
Or “God be with
you!”—and ‘tis not absurd
To think so: for
half English as I am
(To my
misfortune), never can I say
I heard them wish
“God with you,” save that way.
For the narrator, bouts of illness authenticate orthodox doctrines:
The first attack
at once proved the Divinity
(But that I never
doubted, nor the Devil);
The next, the
Virgin’s mystical virginity;
The third, the
usual Origin of Evil;
The fourth at once
established the whole Trinity
On so
uncontrovertible a level,
That I devoutly
wished the three were four
On purpose to
believe so much the more.
Despite the wry impieties, Byron was never secure in his apostasy. “He had
read enough of Hume and the Voltairian skeptics before he left Cambridge to
unsettle his faith in the dogmas of the established religion, both Catholic and
Protestant, and to make him an agnostic,” noted biographer Leslie Marchand,
“but he never completely made up his mind.” Percy Bysshe Shelley, his
neighbor and fellow exile in Switzerland, bemoaned his own inability to “eradicate
from Byron’s great mind the delusions of Christianity, which, in spite of his
reason, seem perpetually to recur.”
“Let us ponder boldly,” Byron wrote, “’tis a base / Abandonment of
reason to resign / Our right of thought—our last and only place / Of refuge;
this, at least, shall be mine.”
But the demons of his childhood dwelt there, too.
© 2002 Gary Sloan
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